如何解密Jenkins 8 8mha值

Question

如果我们查看Jenkins作业日志，我们可以看到其中包含的文本与查看控制台输出时在浏览器中显示的内容完全相同，但日志文件中的是用标记[8mha]编码的。

有人知道我们怎么“解密”它吗？

已经尝试了一个简单的base64，但它不起作用。

这是其中一个字符串

[8mha:AAAAqR+LCAAAAAAAAP9b85aBtbiIQSajNKU4P08vOT+vOD8nVc+jsiC1KCczL9svvyTVzHb1RttJBUeZGJg8GdhyUvPSSzJ8GJhLi3JKGIR8shLLEvVzEvPS9YNLijLz0q0rihik0IxzhtAgwxgggJGJgaGiAMiQL2HQ0c/KT9J3zkhNzs4vLVE1MtAFYpfEkkQg5ZuYl5ieWgRkBbgF65sa6QMAtVXQDbEAAAA=[0m

Answer 1

https://github.com/LarrysGIT/Extract-Jenkins-Raw-Log/blob/master/README.md

简短的回答，

它没有加密，仍然是BASE64字符串，

例如，

由用户[8mha:////4H+H6gi+RzqRXgbuxDkiDNvJYq3pMCu17+YXxGOB+mHbAAAAlx+LCAAAAAAAAP9b85aBtbiIQTGjNKU4P08vOT+vOD8nVc83PyU1x6OyILUoJzMv2y+/JJUBAhiZGBgqihhk0NSjKDWzXb3RdlLBUSYGJk8GtpzUvPSSDB8G5tKinBIGIZ+sxLJE/ZzEvHT94JKizLx0a6BxUmjGOUNodHsLgAzWEgZu/dLi1CL9xJTczDwAj6GcLcAAAAA=[0madmin启动

可以分为以下几部分，

A string：由用户启动的

Preamber：\u001B[8 8mha：]

////4H+H6gi+RzqRXgbuxDkiDNvJYq3pMCu17+YXxGOB+mHbAAAAlx+LCAAAAAAAAP9b85aBtbiIQTGjNKU4P08vOT+vOD8nVc83PyU1x6OyILUoJzMv2y+/JJUBAhiZGBgqihhk0NSjKDWzXb3RdlLBUSYGJk8GtpzUvPSSDB8G5tKinBIGIZ+sxLJE/ZzEvHT94JKizLx0a6BxUmjGOUNodHsLgAzWEgZu/dLi1CL9xJTczDwAj6GcLcAAAAA=：Base64 string

Postamber：\u001B[0m ]

A string：管理

将base64字符串转换为字节，修剪第一个40字节(https://github.com/LarrysGIT/Extract-Jenkins-Raw-Log/issues/1)并保存为.gz文件。现在，您可以从.gz文件中提取真正的内容。

在本例中，内容类型为Java serialization data, version 5

超链接节点6=±=‘p hudson.console.ModelHyperlinkNote lengthL urlt Ljava/lang/String;xr hudson.console.ConsoleNote xp t/user/hudson.console.ConsoleNote

Answer 2

该字符串是ansi-/彩色编码日志输出。要查看纯文本版本，可以使用https://github.com/mmalecki/ansispan。所以，给定的字符串

    [8mha:AAAAaB+LCAAAAAAAAP9b85aBtbiIwTG/KF0vKzUvOzOvODlTryCnNB3I0ivPL8pOy8kv18vKT9JLzs8rzs9J1QuHCgaV5jlDhPzyS1IZIICRiYGhoohBKqM0pTg/D64Hh8ICAFt0h+h/AAAA[0m[Pipeline] { (prepare)
    [8mha:AAAAaB+LCAAAAAAAAP9b85aBtbiIwTG/KF0vKzUvOzOvODlTryCnNB3I0ivPL8pOy8kv18vKT9JLzs8rzs9J1QuHCgaV5jlDhPzyS1IZIICRiYGhoohBKqM0pTg/D64Hh8ICAFt0h+h/AAAA[0m[Pipeline] }
    [8mha:AAAAaB+LCAAAAAAAAP9b85aBtbiIwTG/KF0vKzUvOzOvODlTryCnNB3I0ivPL8pOy8kv18vKT9JLzs8rzs9J1QuHCgaV5jlDhPzyS1IZIICRiYGhoohBKqM0pTg/D64Hh8ICAFt0h+h/AAAA[0m[Pipeline] // stage
    [8mha:AAAAaB+LCAAAAAAAAP9b85aBtbiIwTG/KF0vKzUvOzOvODlTryCnNB3I0ivPL8pOy8kv18vKT9JLzs8rzs9J1QuHCgaV5jlDhPzyS1IZIICRiYGhoohBKqM0pTg/D64Hh8ICAFt0h+h/AAAA[0m[Pipeline] stage
    [8mha:AAAAaB+LCAAAAAAAAP9b85aBtbiIwTG/KF0vKzUvOzOvODlTryCnNB3I0ivPL8pOy8kv18vKT9JLzs8rzs9J1QuHCgaV5jlDhPzyS1IZIICRiYGhoohBKqM0pTg/D64Hh8ICAFt0h+h/AAAA[0m[Pipeline] { (deployApplication)
    [8mha:AAAAaB+LCAAAAAAAAP9b85aBtbiIwTG/KF0vKzUvOzOvODlTryCnNB3I0ivPL8pOy8kv18vKT9JLzs8rzs9J1QuHCgaV5jlDhPzyS1IZIICRiYGhoohBKqM0pTg/D64Hh8ICAFt0h+h/AAAA[0m[Pipeline] }
    [8mha:AAAAaB+LCAAAAAAAAP9b85aBtbiIwTG/KF0vKzUvOzOvODlTryCnNB3I0ivPL8pOy8kv18vKT9JLzs8rzs9J1QuHCgaV5jlDhPzyS1IZIICRiYGhoohBKqM0pTg/D64Hh8ICAFt0h+h/AAAA[0m[Pipeline] // stage

会导致

    [Pipeline] { (prepare)
    [Pipeline] }
    [Pipeline] // stage
    [Pipeline] stage
    [Pipeline] { (deployApplication)
    [Pipeline] }
    [Pipeline] // stage